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ithout undue exaggeration I can acknowledge that everything I 
didn’t learn in law school,1 I learned from Arthur Miller, via 
assiduous (and often last-minute) research in the pages of Wright & 
Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure.  As a newly minted lawyer, 
I was the next best thing to a sole practitioner: I worked for a single, 
more-experienced lawyer, in a small general law practice in Sonoma, 
California.  In those days, in the first dawn of online legal research, I 
spent many hours in the Sonoma County Law Library, which was 
equipped with Wright & Miller and the other necessary accoutrements 
of book-based legal research.  My boss, Robert L. Lieff, an alumnus 
of Melvin M. Belli’s groundbreaking and altogether remarkable law 
firm, taught me how to treat my real bosses—the judges before whom 
I appeared and the clients I served—with respect, deference, and 
civility.  Largely by example, Bob Lieff conveyed the invaluable 
lesson that a successful life in the law depended primarily upon not 
acting like a jerk.  I am still struggling to implement this wisdom.  For 
matters of federal civil procedure, the other essential for a young 
lawyer attempting to effectively represent her clients in the federal 
courts, I turned to Arthur R. Miller. 
 
* Ms. Cabraser is a founding partner of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, 
whose practice concentrates on the representation of plaintiffs in class actions and other 
aggregate litigation in the federal and state courts.  The views expressed in this Essay are 
those of the author. 
1 I likewise acknowledge that I was provided an excellent legal education, courtesy of 
the People of California, by the University of California, at Boalt Hall (also known as 
Berkeley Law).  Whether I actually received the education on offer is an open question. 
W
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From the viewpoint of one of the thousands of practitioners who 
have availed themselves of the guidance of Wright & Miller on a 
daily basis, the value of this monumental work lies not only in its 
existence (the colossal achievement of Professor Charles Alan 
Wright, its creator), but in its currency and accessibility.  Plainly put, 
this multivolume work is actually readable.  It is a wonder of lucid 
writing and clear organization.  Wright & Miller (now mostly 
“Miller,” albeit with important contributions and updates by other 
eminent proceduralists including Mary Kay Kane) is a treatise that 
belongs not only, or primarily, to academics, but to working judges; 
and lawyers, who rely upon it to guide our thinking and to provide 
authority for our briefs, consider it “our” book.  It explains to us how 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure work and why they work as they 
do.  It collects and summarizes cases, but does much more than that: 
it synthesizes the text of the Rules and the judicial decisions 
interpreting them into something that is not only a coherent and 
functional whole, but a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.  
The Federal Rules and the judicial decisions that implement and 
enforce them deserve and require a logical, explanatory guide that not 
only summarizes but reveals and articulates the principles sometimes 
hidden in the Rules and cases.  The Wright & Miller set is that guide. 
Because the Federal Rules themselves, the case law that interprets 
them, and the Wright & Miller treatise coexist, and because this 
coexistence is not a merely parallel existence, but a symbiotic 
feedback system, we have, as befits our common-law legal culture, a 
common law of civil procedure.  Our Federal Rules are both more and 
less than a civil code: they operate within a broad field of judicial 
discretion; they are subject to ongoing amendment and refinement.  
The Wright & Miller treatise assures that this evolutionary process 
can occur, through its constant restatement and synthesis of that 
progress. 
There is, it appears, an animating principle, a deep legal 
philosophy, behind the functional genius of Arthur Miller’s federal 
practice and procedural work: that the law should be understandable 
and accessible to everyone.  It is no coincidence that the Miller of 
Wright & Miller is also the Miller of Miller’s Court.2  For years, 
 
2 This public television show, which began broadcast in 1979 and ran through 1988 
(emanating from WCVB-TV in Boston), did not flinch from featuring a real law professor 
explaining the law, through the window of actual cases, to the general public.  Although he 
is the functional equivalent of aristocracy (Queen Elizabeth II bestowed the title of 
Commander of the Order of the British Empire upon him last year), he is considered to be 
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millions of Americans woke up to his legal commentary on ABC’s 
Good Morning America.  Neither his popularity nor populism requires 
nor signifies a “dumbing down” of the profoundly democratic legal 
philosophy of Arthur R. Miller.  Indeed, it is a challenge of the 
highest order to render the law, in either its substantive or procedural 
aspects, clear and plain.  The most beautiful passage, to my mind, that 
exists in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also poses the greatest 
challenge to any legal pleading: to state “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”3 
To articulate a “short and plain statement” of any aspect of 
substantive or procedural law, with all its nuance, discretion, and oft-
times its ambiguity, is an achievement of the highest order.  It is what 
we strive for as practitioners and advocates in our pleadings and 
briefs, as teachers in our classes and instructive writings, and as 
judges in legal decisions.  Our English language with its nearly 
inexhaustible synonyms, similes, metaphors, redundancies, and 
surplusages, is as often a hindrance as a help.  Yet the writing, like the 
speech, of Arthur R. Miller is a model of plainness, in the best, most 
eloquent, and most inherently democratic sense. 
It is no small tribute to his high profile as quintessential law 
professor that the NYU Law Revue’s 2009 animated video, “What 
Would Arthur Miller Do?” has been viewed nearly 40,000 times.4  
Legal scholars and/or students are not alone in asking WWAMD?  
Those of us who toil in the trenches of complex litigation ask 
ourselves this question constantly, consult Wright & Miller, and, 
when all else fails, consult the source himself for the requisite 
illumination. 
Those of us who labor in the field of class actions owe a special 
debt to Professor Miller.  He has argued groundbreaking cases that 
have shaped the courts’ perception of the purpose and function of 
class actions as representative suits essential to provide judicial access 
to investors, consumers, and tort victims whose claims, if brought 
alone, would not survive the expense and delay of solo litigation.  The 
cliché “too numerous to mention” was likely coined to describe the 
sheer number of Arthur Miller’s Rule 23 briefs and arguments.  
Among them are such momentous decisions as Phillips Petroleum v. 
 
every American’s law professor, in much the same way the late Mel Belli was every 
American’s lawyer. 
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
4 NYU Law Revue, What Would Arthur Miller Do?, YOUTUBE (Mar. 20, 2009), 
youtube.com/watch?v=32tS4jPTL54. 
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Shutts,5 Tellabs,6 Cendant,7 In re Asbestos School Litigation,8 
Central Wesleyan,9 and Castano.10 
On several occasions I have had the pleasure of observing 
Professor Miller in inimitable courtroom action.  Whether arguing a 
class certification motion in district court or a complex procedural 
point on appeal, he fascinates and educates his judicial audience with 
grace, enthusiasm, and an erudition that engages rather than alienates.  
Judges look forward to his appearances in part, I suspect, because he 
is that rarity, a true legal celebrity, but more because his enchantment 
with the law is contagious.  All of us are recharged and reinvigorated 
as legal professionals by exposure to Arthur Miller. 
These are challenging times for the courts, the rule of law, and the 
legal profession.  Nothing less than access to the equal justice our 
Constitution guarantees is at stake.  Judicial independence is under 
virulent political attack, lawyers (as always) are distrusted, and 
widespread cynicism that legal power correlates with economic power 
corrodes the public’s confidence in the integrity of the law.  Those 
among us who demonstrate joyful dedication to—and delight in—
American law are thus to be especially treasured, encouraged, and 
honored.  In the legal academic world, as in the public mind, Arthur 
R. Miller still heads this list. 
A recent article by Professor Miller, expressing his concerns with 
the heightened pleading standards recently articulated by the Supreme 
Court in the pair of decisions now known as Iqbal11 and Twombly,12 
provides a profound and current insight into his practical, and 
populist, procedural vision.  This article, From Conley to Twombly to 
Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
American to its core: it employs a baseball analogy to illuminate its 
title.13 
 
5 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
6 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
7 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). 
8 In re Asbestos School Litig., 46 F.3d 1284 (3d Cir. 1994). 
9 Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1993). 
10 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
12 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
13 As the article explains, “the title seeks to evoke the image of Joe Tinker, Johnny 
Evers, and Frank Chance, Hall of Fame Chicago Cubs infielders in the early years of the 
twentieth century, whose remarkable double-play skills were immortalized in a poem by 
Franklin Pierce Adams in the New York Evening Mail on July 12, 1910.”  60 DUKE L.J. 1, 
1 (2010). 
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The Double Play article is Miller’s paean to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, as adopted in 1938, not coincidentally in the depth 
of the Great Depression.  As Miller describes this most monumental 
public work, the 1938 Rules constitute a system that “reshaped civil 
litigation to reflect core values of citizen access to the justice system 
and adjudication on the merits based on a full disclosure of relevant 
information.”14  Miller explains that “the Federal Rules created a 
system that relied on plain language and minimized procedural 
traps”15 and that it opened the doors of federal courthouses across the 
nation to the grievances of the country’s own citizens.  As Professor 
Miller further elucidates, 
Beneath the surface of these broad procedural concepts lay several 
significant policy objectives.  The Rules were intended to support a 
central philosophical principle: the procedural system of the federal 
courts should be premised on equality of treatment of all parties and 
claims in the civil adjudication process.  It should abjure technical 
decisionmaking and “promote the ends of justice.”  The simple but 
ambitious notion was that the legal rights of citizens should be 
enforced.  This idea was a baseline democratic tenet of the 1930s 
and then of postwar America with regard to such matters as civil 
rights, the distribution of social and political power, marketplace 
status, and equality of opportunity.16 
As a plaintiff’s advocate, prosecuting class actions arising under 
both federal statutes and state laws, I have gratefully taken advantage 
of this access and openness throughout my professional career, and, 
as the twentieth century progressed into the twenty-first, it seemed 
that this promise of access was ever more necessary in light of the 
nationalization and globalization of markets; the standardization of 
products and services; and the use of broadcast media—and now the 
internet—to communicate, market, advertise, and distribute goods and 
services in a market in which the consumers on which these markets 
depend ironically appear to have less and less power and control over 
the safety, quality, and integrity of the goods and services offered to 
them.  Courts offer, often, the sole recourse of consumers when the 
honor system fails, and the profit motive prevails unchecked. 
As Miller recounts, the Federal Rules adopted in 1938, and 
amended incrementally ever since (often with the direct and 
influential participation of Professor Miller himself, as sometime 
Rules Committee Reporter, and as perpetual Rules commentator) 
 
14 Id. at 3–4. 
15 Id. at 4–5 (internal footnote omitted). 
16 Id. at 5. 
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were designed to erect and protect the access of citizens to the courts, 
in order to protect the procedural rights of citizens to effectively seek 
redress of grievances: 
As significant new areas of federal substantive law emerged and 
existing ones were augmented, the importance of private 
enforcement of key national policies, of litigation as an instrument 
of social policy, and of expanding state-based tort and consumer-
protection theories came to the fore in numerous contexts.  The 
openness and simplicity of the Rules facilitated citizen enforcement 
of congressional and constitutional policies through civil litigation.  
The federal courts increasingly were seen as an alternative or an 
adjunct to centralized, or administrative governmental oversight in 
fields such as competition, capital markets, product safety, and 
discrimination.  Even though private lawsuits might be viewed as an 
inefficient ex post method of enforcing public policies, they have 
dispersed regulatory authority; achieved greater transparency; 
provided a source of compensation, deterrence, and institutional 
governance; and led to leaner government involvement.  Without 
this private-attorneys-general concept, the substitution of an 
alternative methodology would be necessary.  This probably would 
mean the establishment of the type of continental-style, centralized 
bureaucracies and administrative enforcement that many think are 
inconsistent with our culture and heritage.17 
In Professor Miller’s account, the Federal Rules are thus 
inherently, and quintessentially, American: they are democratic and 
egalitarian.  They are there to insure that the rights of access to the 
free market are balanced with the reciprocity of responsibility that is 
the hallmark of the social contract on which we claim our 
government, and our society, is based.  That these Rules, and this 
philosophy, was apparently bypassed by the Supreme Court itself in 
its Twombly and Iqbal decisions, is the subject of Miller’s Double 
Play lament.  He is not alone. 
Academics, judges, and practitioners of all philosophies, and of all 
political affiliations and sympathies, have come to recognize modern 
civil litigation, as practiced under the Federal Rules, to have become 
increasingly costly, protracted, and oppressive.  Access has been lost, 
and expense has been added.  The system has been gamed, to the 
seeming advantage of those willing and able to spend the most money 
to buy procedure (primarily discovery and resistance to discovery) at 
the expense of the original intent of the Rules: to speed progress from 
the initiation of a case to its adjudication on the merits.  A tremendous 
initiative is underway to reverse this trend, and to restore balance 
 
17 Id. at 5–6 (internal footnote omitted). 
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within the federal litigation system, under the Federal Rules, so that, 
once more, the spirit and mission of the Rules, as announced in Rule 
1, that “[t]hey should be construed and administered to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding” becomes a living embodiment of the Rules in action, as 
opposed to a mere platitude, observed primarily in the breach.  As this 
occurs, due credit for recognition and acknowledgement that the 
Rules have strayed from their original intent, and should be restored 
to their democratic function, must go to Arthur R. Miller, their great 
son, expositor, and enabler. 
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